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Abstract 
The procurement of UK public services has seen considerable changes during the 
final twenty years of the millennium.  Successive governments have legislated to 
impose firstly compulsion to compete on price, followed by a duty to achieve Best 
Value.  Property and construction professional consultants were under an obligation 
to their professional bodies not to compete on price less than twenty years ago.  The 
first part of this paper chronicles the main stages in this period of great change.  
Many commentators in the public and private sectors have predicted a decline in 
service quality as firms have been forced to cut costs in order to survive in highly 
competitive markets.  The second part of the paper reports an empirical study that 
has investigated whether there is any substance to these predictions.  One hundred 
and eighty nine public sector clients have assessed private sector consultants with a 
view to establishing whether those consultants appointed by competitive fee 
tendering perform less well than those appointed by other methods.  The 
development of SURVEYQUAL, a twenty-five item service quality assessment scale 
is described briefly.  Service quality is not significantly lower for those consultants 
appointed by competition.  However the data suggest that public service clients can 
positively influence service quality by taking great care with the pre-selection of 
tenderers.     
Keywords:  Public Sector, Property and Construction Professionals, Service  
  Quality, Competitive Fee Tendering. 
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Introduction 
When Leonidas’ 300 Spartans died defying the vast numerical superiority of 
the Persian Empire, it was a defeat of quality by quantity, of expensive military 
experts by comparative, if anachronistic cannon fodder.  Most marketplaces 
from time to time must suffer from the Thermopylae factor and that appears to 
be increasingly the case in the competitively tendered world of real estate.  
Those genuinely able to provide a service lose out on a value for money 
calculation to somebody who does not really understand what that service is. 
  
This rather jaundiced view of competitive fee tendering is provided by a UK property 
professional (Whitehead, 1999) who appears to have been on the wrong end of the 
value for money calculation recently!  Yet the majority of property and construction 
professional services carried out by the private sector for the UK public sector are 
now let on a fee tendered basis.  Following the abolition of professional institution 
mandatory fee scales for such work less than twenty years ago, there has been 
unrelenting pressure from successive UK governments for competition to prevail.  
This paper charts this development and then attempts to answer the question 
implied by the final sentence of Whitehead’s statement – has fee tendering led to 
lower standards of service quality in the provision of public sector professional 
services in the property and construction field? 
 
The Background to Competition 
The current economic climate in which construction professionals operate is highly 
competitive with commissions of any size rarely being awarded without some form of 
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fee tendering exercise.  Yet it is only 17 years since the RICS amended Bye-law 24 
from : 
No member shall with the object of securing instructions or supplanting 
another member of the surveying profession, knowingly attempt to compete 
on the basis of fees and commissions. 
to 
... no Member shall ... quote a fee for professional services without having 
received information to enable the Member to assess the nature and scope of  
the services  required. (RICS, 1990, p4)   
 
At about this time all of the institutions representing construction professionals were 
capitulating to the Conservative Government’s pressure for competitive forces to 
prevail.  This pressure intensified in the early 1990’s as Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering (CCT) was introduced for a range of local and central government 
services.  This up-beat message was communicated in a White Paper in 1991 : 
Competition is the best guarantee of quality and value for money. In the 
1980s, the Government’s policy of increasing competition gave a new 
dynamism to the British economy.  We mean to extend these policies in the 
1990s.  We will expand the frontiers of competition outwards, bringing new 
benefits to all those who use or work in public services .       
       (HM Treasury, 1991, p1) 
    
The White Paper, entitled Competing for Quality proposed legislation (under the 
Local Government Act 1988) to expand competition in the provision of services by 
Central Government Departments, the National Health Service and Local Authorities.  
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In 1992 the Secretary of State for the Environment announced that compulsory 
competitive tendering (CCT) was to be extended to a range of local authority 
professional and corporate services.  In February 1994 proposals for the 
implementation of CCT for professional construction-related and property services 
were announced (DOE, 1994).  The initial timetable for metropolitan districts and 
London boroughs was to implement CCT for 35% of these services on 1 October 
1995 rising to 65% from 1 April 1996.  Shire Counties and districts subject to 
possible unitary authority re-organisation were exempt from these requirements until 
after the re-organisation review has been completed.  The latest government 
guidance on CCT for professional services required only 55% of an authority’s 
construction and property services to be exposed to competition (DETR, 1997).     
 
The UK stood alone in Europe as the only country to introduce compulsion to tender 
(Pottinger, 1995, p25) and CCT has had many critics, including Sir Michael Latham:   
I do not like compulsory competitive fee bidding as a route for selecting 
consultants.  I agree with a very large and experienced private sector retail 
client, with an annual spend of umpteen million pounds, who told me that he 
would never dream of selecting a consultant on such a basis, and always 
used negotiation.  He did not pay what the contractor asked for, still less 
contemplate a scale fee, but he did not believe in a sacrificial fee either.  He 
wanted the best service, and expected to pay for it.  If he did not get it, he 
looked elsewhere next time.               
                                           (Latham, 1997, p58) 
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The Labour Government announced within weeks of being elected that it would 
eventually replace CCT with a Duty of Best Value (DOE,1997).  CCT was seen as 
discouraging local ownership and responsibility, neglecting service quality and 
inflexible in practice (DETR, 1998, p5).    Other criticisms included the fact that all too 
often the process of competition became an end in itself (DETR, 1998, p6) and in 
many cases the lack of any interest in an external competition (DETR, 1998, p20).  
This reflected the mixed response from the private sector : 
Many private sector firms were reluctant to become involved because of the 
complexity of the CCT process and its often adversarial nature.  Some firms 
had a policy of not bidding if there was an in-house bid.  
                                                                                                 (RICS, 1997) 
 
The principal concern in the public sector was over the possible loss of jobs and the 
extensive reorganisation necessary to separate client and supply functions. 
 
The duty of Best Value was enacted in the Local Government Act 1999 and the main 
provisions of the legislation are: 
• All CCT legislation was repealed on 2 January 2000. 
• Authorities to publish Best Value Performance Plans by 31 March 2000 and 
external auditors to report on them by 30 June 2000.  These plans to set out a 
programme of Best Value Reviews, including an assessment of previous 
performance in 1999-2000 and set measurable targets for the years ahead. 
• The Duty of Best Value was imposed from 1 April 2000 when the process of 5 
year review cycles commenced.  These were supported by an external audit and 
inspection regime. 
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• The Secretary of State has powers to intervene where an authority is failing to 
provide best value.       (DETR, 1999a) 
 
The reviews are central to Best Value and must include demanding performance 
targets to ensure continuous improvement.  The government suggests that the 
reviews should incorporate the “4Cs” : 
• challenge why and how the service is being provided; 
• secure comparison with the performance of others across a range of relevant 
indicators, taking into account the views of both service users and potential 
suppliers; 
• consult local taxpayers, service users, partners and the wider business 
community in the setting of new performance targets; 
• consider fair competition as a means of securing efficient and effective services.  
(DETR, 1999b) 
 
Thus it will be seen that the Best Value concept has its origins in the fundamental 
late Twentieth Century management concepts of competition, benchmarking and 
continuous improvement.   The big difference between Best value and CCT is that in 
the new regime service quality is given as much emphasis as the cost of the work. 
 
The Fee Tendering Process 
Several guides to good practice for fee tendering have been produced (e.g. CIC, 
1992 and CIRIA, 1994).  An analysis of these documents suggests that each of the 
following factors is critical to achieving a successful outcome : 
• adequate specification of the service required at the time of going out to tender; 
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• careful pre-selection of tenderers; 
• adequate weighting to ability given in the final selection process.  
 
Of particular relevance to this final point are the findings of the Construction Industry 
Board (CIB) who were tasked  “..... to choose and then endorse a specific quality and 
price assessment mechanism for the engagement of professional consultants”, 
which was part of Recommendation 13.5 of the Latham Report (Latham, 1994, p47).  
Working Group 4’s Report, “Selecting Consultants for the Team : Balancing Quality 
and Price”, (CIB, 1996) contains detailed guidance for the adoption of such a 
mechanism. 
 
Service Quality and Competition  
The Whitehead (1999) quotation, with which this paper commenced, implies that 
competition can lead to lower service quality.  Such assertions have been common 
throughout the last thirty years.  It is of interest to consider what, if anything, was 
predicted about the possible effects on service quality of the removal of mandatory 
fee scales when abolition took place.  The Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC) report on professional services of 1970, which paved the way for abolition, 
considered this briefly, remarking that : 
Price Competition might create serious dangers in relation to quality of 
services of a particularly personal nature or of whose quality the public are 
generally incapable of judging.  Some clients might accept incompetent 
service at a lower price without appreciating the risk involved. (Monopolies & 
Mergers Commission, 1970, pp 78-79) 
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The MMC concluded that such cases would be likely to be exceptional.  However, 
many professional services are high in credence qualities (Zeithaml, 1981, pp 186-
190).  That is, clients find them difficult to assess because they do not possess the 
skills to do so.  This suggests that the scenario described in the 1970 report may be 
more common than the MMC anticipated.  
 
In their evidence to the 1977 MMC report on surveyors’ services, the Institute of 
Quantity Surveyors said that if the abolition of fee scales led to price cutting then this 
would “go hand in hand” with a general fall in standards.  (Monopoly and Mergers 
Commission, 1977, paragraph 257, p 66),  The Association of Consulting Engineers 
were as vociferous as any of the construction and property professions in defending 
the status quo.  In some respects consulting engineers had more to lose than any of 
the professions, working as many of them did directly for the government on the very 
large road building programme of the time. The Association expressed a belief that 
to allow fee competition might pave the way for a variety of evils : among them the 
loss of professional trust and public responsibility, a greater incidence of penny-
pinching, and inadequate designs which might result in injury and even death 
(Mansfield, 1986).   
 
Have these fears been realised?  As Latham reports “Few professional consultants 
are likely to admit openly that they have personally reduced their services because 
of competitive fees” (Latham, 1994, p 44).  There is however at least some anecdotal 
evidence of a decline in professional standards in the construction professions which 
could possibly be attributed to the lower level of fees resulting from intense 
competition.  The Association of Consulting Engineers in their evidence to Latham 
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presented the results of a questionnaire survey of 53 of its members.  They 
presented several statistics about fee tendered services, which included the 
following: 
• 73% give less consideration to design alternatives; 
• 31% give less consideration to checking and reviewing designs; 
• 40% consider that the risks of design errors occurring are higher; 
• 74% admit that they are producing simpler designs to minimise the commitment 
of resources to a task; 
• 84% assess the number of claims for additional fees to be higher; 
• 69% see less trust between client and consulting engineer; 
• 94% bid low to maintain the cash flow or (on occasion) to test the market; 
• 35% bid low with the intention of doing less than in the enquiry; 
• 61% bid low with the intention of making up fees with claims for variations. 
(Latham, 1994, pp 44-45). 
 
Latham also referred to a report by the Royal Incorporation of Architects in  Scotland 
which contains the following quotation from one firm : 
"We look to limit our service in the fee tendered service and are prepared to claim for 
extra services.  We only make the client aware when appropriate.  We cut back on 
(stages) A to D, and severely limit service after (stage) G, and are ready to claim for 
any additional efforts.  We cut down on meetings / site visits / number of drawings 
and manufacturer’s drawings.  We do not do site minutes, we design it only once, 
and alterations will be on (a) time (basis)."  (Latham, 1994, p 44). 
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Within the main profession under investigation during this research, Chartered 
Surveyors, fears were being expressed  as this research commenced that fee levels 
had sunk too low.  In 1993 in an article subtitled “Have surveyors gone too low?” in 
the weekly journal, evidence of very low commissions was presented.  The article 
states, 
Few surveyors will own up to fee cutting but in reality they’re all doing it, some 
even going beyond the bounds of healthy free-market competition into loss 
making territory.  Most players in the market acknowledge that when fee 
levels get below a certain point there is a danger that the quality of work will 
suffer.   (Morgan, 1993, p28).  
 
Research Hypotheses 
The evidence provided above came almost exclusively from the professions but of 
course it is public sector clients’ perceptions which are important here.  With this fact 
in mind the following hypotheses were stated as the basis for the research reported 
in this paper: 
Hypothesis 1:  Clients’ perceptions of service quality are lower for   
   commissions let by competitive fee tendering than with  
   other methods of appointment. 
Hypothesis 2: Clients’ perceptions of service quality are increased when  
   they have adequately specified the service required prior  
   to tendering.   
Hypothesis 3: Clients’ perceptions of service quality are increased when  
   they have carefully pre-selected tenderers.   
 10
Hypothesis 4: Clients’ perceptions of service quality are increased when  
   they have given adequate weighting to ability in the final  
   selection process.   
Hypothesis 5: Clients’ perceptions of service quality are lower when the  
   fee bid is more competitive. 
 
Measuring Service Quality 
Testing these hypotheses involved measuring public sector clients’ perceptions of 
service quality but is this as easy as it might at first seem?  Given that "Quality is an 
elusive concept" (Gummesson, 1981, p111) how does one attempt to measure it?   
A group of service marketing researchers in the United States have developed a 
generic service quality assessment scale that has been used extensively in industry 
and academe in recent years. Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry’s (1988 and 1991) 
twenty-two item scale is known as SERVQUAL and measures quality across the five 
dimensions that they discovered (see Table 1). 
 
    Table 1:  The SERVQUAL Scale (Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry, 1991) 
 
Dimension Description Number of Items 
Tangibles Physical facilities, equipment, and 
appearance of personnel 
4 
Reliability Ability to perform the promised service 
dependably and accurately 
5 
Responsiveness Willingness to help customers and provide 
prompt service 
4 
Assurance Knowledge and courtesy of employees and 
their ability to inspire trust and confidence 
4 
Empathy Caring, individualised attention the firm 
provides its customers 
5 
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The SERVQUAL development work has been replicated by many researchers and 
several have recommended that the scale be adapted to suit each particular service 
setting.  The SURVEYQUAL scale which has been used to test this study’s 
hypotheses was developed by carrying out a comparison of the SERVQUAL study 
and  three other studies, which were :- 
• a study of architectural service quality (Cravens, Dielman and Kent, 1985),  
• RESERV - a scale for assessing US real estate brokers (Nelson and Nelson, 
1995), 
• a study of UK building surveying service quality ( Hoxley, 1994).     
 
The resulting scale has 25 items upon which clients were requested to rate an 
anonymous consultant using a balanced Likert 7 point attitude scale. Three items 
which were included originally were dropped following purification of the scale 
because they were found to have insufficient correlation with other scale items and 
therefore with “service quality”.  Two items were concerned with the consultant’s 
office - with its location and its appearance and the other with the size of the firm. 
The 25 scale items are shown in Table 2 below. 
 
 Table 2  :  SURVEYQUAL Statements  
                  Statement    
 
XYZ use up-to-date technology 
The staff of XYZ are always tidy in appearance 
The written and graphical output of XYZ is well presented 
XYZ’s solutions to problems are technically correct 
The design element of XYZ’s work shows creativity and capability 
XYZ provides its services at the time it promises to 
XYZ tells me when it will perform the service for me 
XYZ provides prompt service 
XYZ and its employees are always willing to help me 
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XYZ and its employees are never too busy to respond to my requests 
Employees of XYZ are easily accessible to me 
I feel safe in my dealings with XYZ 
XYZ and its employees are always polite to me 
Employees of XYZ have the knowledge and competence to solve my 
problems 
XYZ and its employees have experience relevant to the service I 
require 
XYZ provide me with personal attention 
XYZ have only my best interests at heart 
XYZ understand my problems 
I will benefit from a long term working relationship with XYZ 
XYZ and I have similar views about things that are important 
XYZ provide good cost control of projects 
The partners or directors of XYZ stay involved with my projects 
The site supervision of projects by XYZ is good 
The standard of verbal presentation by employees of XYZ is good 
XYZ and its employees understand my organisation 
 
 
 
Data Collection 
The scale was sent to 400 public sector client organisations located throughout the 
UK and 189 clients responded (47%) by anonymously assessing consultants.  
Figures 1 and 2 below indicate the types of clients who responded and the 
professions of the consultants assessed.  It will be seen that 70% of the clients were 
local authorities and that nearly 60% of the professionals were Chartered Surveyors 
(and over half of these were Quantity Surveyors). 
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District Council
47%
County Council
23%
University
7%
Housing Association
4%
Government Agency
12%
Health Auth./Trust
7%
         
Figure 1 :  Respondent Client Organisations 
Chartered Surveyors
58%
Architects
19%
Engineers
12%
Multi-disciplinary
7%
Other Professions
4%
 
 Figure 2 :  Professionals Assessed  
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Data Analysis 
 
An exploratory factor analysis condensed the 25 scale items into 4 factors which the 
researcher has named “What,” “When” “How” and “Who”.  The statistical analysis 
confirmed that SURVEYQUAL is both a reliable and valid instrument to measure 
service quality in a construction profession context.  (For a full account of the 
development of the SURVEYQUAL scale and a copy of the research instrument for 
the full data set see Hoxley, 2000a). 
                 
Results 
In addition to the assessment of the consultant, clients also answered questions that 
were associated with the five hypotheses.  Thus they indicated the method by which 
the consultant was appointed (fee tendering, negotiation, direct appointment, etc), 
and also answered questions relevant to the other hypotheses.  In order to test each 
hypothesis the service quality score, using the SURVEYQUAL scale, was computed 
for each case.  Means of this score (the dependent variable) were then computed 
and tabulated for each value of the independent variable associated with each 
hypothesis.  Finally a one-way analysis of variance was computed to test the null 
hypothesis that there are no differences between these means. 
 
The mean scores for the three main methods of appointment are indicated in Figure 
3 below. 
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   Figure 3 :  Mean SURVEYQUAL Scores by Method of Appointment 
 
Nearly 60% of the consultants assessed were appointed by competitive fee 
tendering.  The main hypothesis was however not supported by the data collected, in 
that although a lower score was recorded for those consultants appointed by 
competitive fee tendering, this result was not statistically significant (p=0.34).  
Similarly the hypotheses that service quality is lower when the fee bid is more 
competitive and higher when the service has been well specified and when adequate 
weighting has been given to ability in the final selection process, have not been 
supported by the data.  However the hypothesis that service quality is higher when 
care has been taken with the pre-selection of tenderers is supported by the analysis 
of the data (p=0.04). 
 
Discussion 
The main result of this study has provided reassuring evidence to the institutions 
representing construction and property professions that their members have not 
allowed their standards to slip in the face of increased competition.  Similarly public 
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sector clients can take comfort from the result that government imposed competition 
has not resulted in a substandard service.  The data collection phase of this research 
took place when CCT was in operation.  As discussed previously the Best Value 
regime has been introduced in order that both quality and cost are considered when 
public services are provided. This study suggests that high levels of service quality 
were already being delivered during the CCT era.  There is much evidence that fee 
levels have fallen to a significant extent since the introduction of competition.  If 
service quality has not declined, this can only mean that profitability has fallen and/or 
that consultants have become more efficient.  Certainly professional firms are much 
leaner than they were 15 years ago.  The introduction of IT has contributed to a 
reduction in the number of clerical and technical staff employed by professional 
organisations during that time.  Although a small proportion of professional firms 
have not survived in this highly competitive market, those that have survived, have 
done so by increasing their efficiency and/or accepting reduced profit levels. 
 
Conclusion 
Fee levels have fallen to a significant extent since the abolition of mandatory fee 
scales some seventeen years ago.  The data collected as part of this study suggest 
that fee tendering is now the principal route for the appointment of construction 
professionals for public sector work in the UK.  However the main result of this study 
is that fee tendering has not led to a decline in clients’ perceptions of service quality.  
Another finding is that public sector clients can positively influence the likely level of 
service received from their consultant by taking care with the pre-selection of 
tenderers.  Thus the public sector clients surveyed as part of this study do not share 
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Whitehead’s (1999) view that those consultants successful in the value for money 
calculation do not understand the service they are providing. 
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